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INTRODUCTION 
Leibniz advocated a theory of space (and time) as "relativew-that is, as 
relative to  the physical things ordinarily said to  be located within space (and 
time). He opposed the teaching of Newton's Principia, which casts space and 
time in the role of containers existing on their own and having a make-up that 
is indifferent to the things emplaced in them. Owing to  the general tenor of his 
theory, Leibniz is sometimes seen as a precursor of Einstein and modern 
relativity theory. But this view is mistaken or, a t  any rate, misleading. For  
Leibniz-unlike Einstein and the modern relativists-is not thinking of the 
relativity of dynamical principles to  the choice of a coordinate system within 
nature, so that we compare the situation from the perspective of various 
world-included frameworks. Rather, Leibniz's thesis that "space is relative to 
the things in it" has regard to  the perspective of various alternative possible 
worlds taken as a whole. The mutual attunement of whatever is included in a 
common world is the foundation for space and time, which have no  existence 
apart from the concordance of the mutual "perceptions" of substances (in 
Leibniz's sense of this term). "[Tlhere is no spatial o r  absolute distance o r  
propinquity of substances [monads], and to  say that they arecompressed in a 
point, or disseminated in space, is to  make use of certain fictions of our spirit."' 
As Leibniz saw it, the Newtonian theory of "abso1ute"space envisages this 
space as an  entity in its own right, a content-indifferent container which could 
be filled up with different substantive content in the case of different possible 
worlds. His own theory that space is itself something content-relative implies 
-by way of contrast-that every possible world must have its own character- 
istic spatial structure. The issue comes down to  a metaphysical-rather than 
physical-concern. For in physics we study this world alone, whereas the 
point a t  issue is the question: Do different "possible worlds" have their own 
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spatiotemporal structure or should they be conceptualized as different ways 
of filling up one single common content-indifferent space-time container? 
1. Spatiality: The Conception of Space as Everywhere the Same. 
T o  begin with, let us recognize that the idea o r  conception of space must 
(for Leibniz) be uniformly one and the same with respect to all possible 
worlds. This is true for  space as it is for any and every concept. A possible 
world may o r  may not contain men, and its intelligent creatures may be very 
different from ours, but it cannot alter what humanity is. (The concept of 
humanity may not find application in some other possible world, but it 
cannot undergo alteration there.) In every world-setting, space answers to the 
same conception-it is "the order of coexistence"(not-be it noted-the 
order of coexistents, which, after all, will differ from world to world). For  
Leibniz, every concept is what it is with respect to  any and every possible 
worId-the concept of space included. The concept of spatiality is world- 
uniform because it is world-indifferent. In this regard these concepts of space 
and time operate in exactly the same fashion as  any concept whatsoever. 
Consider the matter from another point of view, however. 
2. One World, One Space. 
The ancient atomists had an  interesting theory of possibility. Confronted 
with a question like "Why do  horses not have horns, as  cows do," they re- 
sponded: "The hornlessness of horses is just a local idiosyncracy of our world 
-our own particular environing neighborhood in the universe. Somewhere 
else in the infinite vastness of space there is another world, otherwise just like 
ours, in which horses d o  have horns." The atomists thus envisaged space as 
one vast framework in which all possibilities are concurrently encompassed. 
Did Leibniz hold a view of this nature? Was space for him one vast, all- 
comprehensive matrix that embraced the actual and possible alike-a super- 
space embracing all possible worlds along with our own, actual world? 
Surely not. For Leibniz, every world has its own space. There is no super- 
space in which distinct possible worlds are co-located with one another. 
Leibniz, as we may say, was a "one-world, one-space" theorist. 
A space for Leibniz is an order of coexisting substances, and distinct indi- 
viduals in distinct worlds do  not coexist with one another. (Coexisting 
substances are afortiori compossible.) There are as many such orders as there 
are families of compossibilia. The limits of a space are coordinate with the 
realm of the substances comprising its correlative world. 
If Leibniz had defined space as the order of possible existents a t  large- 
rather thanas the order of possible co-existents-then, to be sure, there would 
be only one single, all-comprehensive space. For it is clear that different 
substances in different possible worlds d o  bear various relations t o  one 
another-the relation of difference for one thing, but also similarity (in 
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various regards) and so on. But while there are cross-world relations among 
possible substances, there are not (as I interpret Leibniz) any cross-world 
spatial relations. Space is the order of coexistence, and spatial relations are 
confined to coexistents. Distinct worlds are spatially disjoint-or better 
(since disjointness is itself a spatial term) they are spatially unrelated-some- 
what like the dream-worlds of different people, as Leibniz himself suggests. 
3. Distinct Worlds Must Have Distinct Spaces. 
The concept of spatial emplacement thus intersects with that of compossi- 
biIity. From this standpoint it is tempting to ask: "How can one substance 
possibly contradict another if they are located in different spaces?" But toask 
this is to  pick up the wrong end of the stick-it is to  continue to  be caught in 
the trap of the container theory. Substances are located in different spaces 
because they contradict one another: A world in which people otherwise like 
my parents had a daughter instead of a son for their only child must be a 
different world from this one (thanks to  compatibility considerations), and 
must have its own spatiotemporal structure on the basis of these differences. 
In the Paris period Leibnizenunciated a position that (as I interpret him) he 
continued to hold throughout his life: 
[Tlhere could extst an infinity of other spaces and worlds entirely different [from ours] 
They would have no distance from us [nor other special relations to us] if the spirits in- 
habittng them had sensations not related to ours. Exactly as the world and the space of 
dreams differ from our waking world, there could even be In such a world q u ~ t e  different 
laws of motion. (Jagorlrnsk~~, p 114) 
Leibniz's reaching is that every possible world has its own space as  it has its 
own laws. There are many spaces, even as  there are many law-manifolds. T o  
say this does not countervail against the undoubted fact that  WHAT^ space is, 
like WHAT a law is, is uniform throughout all possible worlds. The concept 
(or genus) is uniform even though its exemplifications (or instances) are 
distinct. 
Thus if one confronts the thesis that, for Leibniz, "space is one and the 
same everywhere, for all possible worlds," one must recognize that this is so 
in one sense and not so in another. It is so if we take in view the concept of 
space, but false if we take in view the thing to which this concept applies. For 
while space is-everywhere-the "order of coexistence," it turns out that 
what this order is is necessarily different in different worlds, since different 
worlds contain different (and incompatible) substances and these substances 
internalize such differences. (A difference in substances entails a difference in 
their relations, which entails a difference in ordering relations,) 
For Leibnizian possible worlds, then, a difference in things brings a 
difference in spaces in its wake, even as this difference carries with it a 
difference of laws. There is, in fact, a deep analogy between Leibniz's treat- 
ment of the law-system and that of the space-system of possible worlds. And 
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the following passage regarding laws (from a letter to Arnauld) is one Leibniz 
would unquestionably apply to space as well: 
Just as there IS an Infinity of poss~ble worlds. so also 1s there an ~ n f i n ~ t y  of laws, palred one 
for one, and every possible lnd~v~dual  of every world Includes in ~ t s  notlon the laws of its 
world (Phrl 11, 40) 
4. How are Distinct Spaces Distinct? 
It is worthwhile to  pose abstractly the general (and not strictly Leibnizian) 
issue: What exactly is the cash-value of the difference between speaking of a 
plurality of distinct spaces as opposed to speaking of a single all-comprehensive 
superspace with many distinct sectors or subspaces? And just as one is inclined 
to say that the reality of real physical objects resides in their locatability in one 
common and unified ~ c t u a l s p a c e , ~  why could one not say that the possibility 
of the possible lies in its locatability in one vast and all-inclusive commonand 
unified superspace? 
The answer here turns on two (interrelated) issues: Is the so-called super- 
space such that 
( I )  the various sectors bear such fundamentally spatial relations to one 
another as (for example) relative proximity and distance? 
(2) the various sectors are so connected with one another that one can 
envisage some sort of "transport" within the space along a n  itinerary 
leading from each to the others? 
Clearly, if the answer to  both of these questions is no-if the so-called 
"subspaces" are disconnected from and spatially unrelated to  one another 
then there is no warrant for speaking of an overarching"superspace"at all. 
The pivotal point is this: A space is individuated as a single space through 
the mutual relatedness and connectedness of its parts, and where these 
elements of mutual relation and interconnection are absent, the warrant for 
speaking of a single space is lacking. 
When these general considerations are brought to bear on the Leibnizian 
situation, it is clear that the spaces of distinct possible worlds are-or can 
be-so unrelated and disconnected as to remove all warrant for speaking of a 
single uniting space. The "Wonder1and"of Lewis Carroll's Alice, the "Land of 
07" of L. Baum's stories, and the "Planet Zeta" world of the Dr. Who 
adventures (taken as approximate examples of Leibnizian worlds) are 
sufficiently devoid of spatial connections and relations with one another that 
there is no warrant for taking them as distinct sectors of a single spatial m a t r i ~ . ~  
Different spaces cannot form parts of a unifying superspace because they 
must be fundamentally disjoint-not only in a physical but even in an intel- 
lectual sense. In his extremely interesting meditation "On Existence, Dreams, 
and Space," Leibniz writes: 
[Slpace [is] that wh~ch makes that many perceptions cohere with each other at the same 
tlme The idea of space IS, therefore, that through which, as 1s recognized, we separate 
clcarly the place, and even the world, ofdreams, from ours.. . . From this it followsfurther- 
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more that therc can be tnfinttely many spaces and, hence, worlds, such that between them 
and ours there IS to be no dtstance Platnly as the world and space of dreams dtffer from 
ours. F O  too cdn they have other laws of motton. . When we awake from dreams we come 
upon more congruences that govern bodies, but not that govern mtnds . Whoever asks 
whether another world, or another space, can exist IS asktng to thts extent whether there 
,Ire mlnds that communicate nothtng to us (.lugoci~nrkv, p 115)' 
With Leibniz, moreover, there is a special reason why there can be no such 
thing as a many-world embracing superspace. We know that, for Leibniz, a 
substance internalizes its relations to  others in the property-system that 
constitutes its complete individual notion. Insofar as they go beyond this 
property-internalization, all relations are only "things of the mind," mere 
~ n t i a  rationis whose "being" is virtual and imaginary, devoid of any real 
existence in its own right.' The spatial relations among substances of the same 
possible world-like all other relations among them-thus have at  least a 
derivative possibility of reality, namely that  which arises through the prospect 
of their being realized along with their terms. But a "relationshipnamong the 
incompatible substances of different possible worlds-since they relate 
incompossible terms-can never have both feet together on  the terra infirma 
of at least possible realization. It is, for Leibniz, already stretching matters to 
speak of spatial relations among compossibilities; to contemplate spatial 
relations among incompossibles would stretch the concept of spatial related- 
ness beyond its working limits. (As we have seen, space is "the order of 
coe.ristence," and incompossibles are such that-by their very nature-they 
cannot possibly coexist.) 
5. Why Distinct Spaces? 
It is quite clear why Leibniz wants to insist on the irreconcilable distinctness 
of the different spaces of different possible worlds. For  if those worlds could 
be co-located within one superspace, then it would be feasible to  realize all 
possibilities by the old atomists' device of shelving each possible world in its 
appropriate spot within the all-inclusive matrix. And all room for an  ethics of 
creation-choice would now be removed. Since all that is possible isactual, we 
would return to the omninecessitarianism of Spinoza. 
Leibniz develops this line of thought in the interesting essay "On Freedom" 
of 1679: 
But I was pulled back from thts prectpice by consrdertng those possible things whtch 
neither are nor will be nor have been For if certain possible things never extst, existlng 
things cannot always be necessary; otherwtse it would be tmposstble for other things to 
exist In their place, and whatever never extsts would therefore be imposstble, For it cannot 
be denied that many stories, especially those we call novels, may be regarded as possible, 
even tf they d o  not actually take place In thts particular sequence of the universe whtch 
God has chosen-unless someone imagines that there are certain poettc regtons in the 
inf~nite xtent of space and time where we might see wandering over theearth Ktng Arthur 
of Great Britatn, Amadls of Gaul, and the fabulous Dtetrtch von Bern invented by the 
Germans, A famous phtlosopher of our century does not seem to have been far from such 
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an op~nion,  for he expressly aff~rms omewhere that matter successively recelves all the 
forms of wh~ch it is capable (Descartes. Prrnclples of  Ph~lorophr. Part 111, Art 47) Thls 
oplnlon cannot be defended, for it would obliterate all the beauty of the unlverse and any 
real chotce (Loemker, pp 263 ff.) 
6. A Superspace After All? 
But is there not, after all, a somewhat different basis for holding Leibniz 
committed to a superspace theory? For  spaces-all spaces-are entia rationis 
(since there is no such substance as a space). And, as Leibnizsees it, the entire 
manifold of alternative possible worlds exist in concept in the mind of God sub 
ratione possibilitatis. Does not God relate the different spaces of the different 
possible worlds-coordinating them within one all-embracing superspace? 
Surely not. The fact that the mind of God conceives the various possible 
space-orders no more means that they are comprehended within one super- 
space than does the fact that He conceives infinitely many laws mean that they 
are all comprehended within one superlaw (or the fact that He conceives 
infinitely many numbers mean that these are all parts of one supernumber). 
The concept of a space arises from the conceptualization of spatial relations, 
and these relate the different items embraced within a common world. Spatial 
relations d o  not-and cannot-relate different possible worlds to  one 
another spatially. And for a good reason: different Leibnizian worlds do  not 
bear spatial relations to one another. Their "coexistence" in the mind of God 
is not the sort of coexistence that can give rise to a "space." As Leibniz 
explicitly says in the Jagodinsky passage quoted above, spaces arise out of 
relationships of "distance," which in turn root in the perceptions of sub- 
stances, and there are no  cross-world perceptions. 
7. Cross-world Spatial Comparisons. 
The contention that different possible worlds have their own spaces does, 
however, encounter one difficulty right away-a theoretical difficulty whose 
bearing is general, not bounded by a specifically Leibnizian context. For can 
we not in fact actually make cross-world spatial comparisons? Suppose M. 
Eiffel had made his tower a centimeter shorter. Clearly this diminished tower 
cannot be accommodated within this world of ours along with the actual 
tower. The world it inhabits is clearly another possible world. But sureIy it 
would still maintain various spatial relations to the things of this world: it 
would still be in Paris, and therefore surely closer to  Rome than t o  Toronto. 
In the Leibnizian setting, the answer here is not straightforward-it is 
yes-and-no. 
Think of Leibniz's treatment of analogous hypotheses: the hypothesis, say, 
that Julius Caesar had been born normally, without requiring his mother to 
undergo a "caesarian" section. We know how Leibniz handles this. He insists 
that this variant Caesar is not identical with ours. The Principle of the Identity 
of Indiscernibles precludes strict identification. Only because of a general 
resemblance can we speak-loosely and inaccurately (popularly and without 
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metaphysical strictness)-of this variant individual as "Julius Caesar"(i.e., as 
identical with the Julius Caesar of our world). 
The situation must be viewed in a strictly analogous light with respect to  
space. If the Eiffel tower were a centimeter shorter it would NOT really be in 
Paris any longer-not, that is to say, in our  actual Paris. The "Pariswin which 
it is located-and the "Rome" and "Toronto" to which it has spatial relations 
-are not those of our world, but those of another world. Thus it does not in 
fact have any spatial relations to  the things of our actual world. 
It is surely authentic Leibnizian doctrine that spatial relationships can be 
made only ~r i th in  and not across possible worlds. 
This point becomes particularly telling if we recall the full scope and variety 
of Leibnizian possibilia. There are, t o  be sure, those possible substances 
which arise from hypotheses that modify acrualia-the Adam who does not 
sin, the Judas  who does not betray, the Caesar who does not cross the 
Rubicon. But not all possible substances need be variant versions of actual 
substances. We need not be in a position to re-identify a possible substance 
with any actual individual-not every hypothetical world is a roman h clef 
reworking of the actual one. Leibnizian possible worlds will in general differ 
very drastically from ours in their make-up-so drastically as to remove any 
basis for spatially relating their constituents and those of our  world. 
8. Must the Spatial Structure of Other Worlds Be Like That of Ours? 
But even if distinct worlds have distinct spaces, will it not nevertheless be 
the case that the spatial structure of other worlds will be the same-or at  any 
rate similar-to the spatial structure of ours? 
There is nothing in Leibniz's philosophy that  constrains him to  answer this 
question affirmatively. Consider again the possible world whose Eiffel Tower 
was built a bit shorter (say because the iron founders who made the girders 
worked a trifle less exactingly). Its substances are in general so  similar t o  those 
of our world that its spatial structure would be virtually identical with that of 
ours. But this is a very specialized circumstance, one that will certainly not be 
realized in general. 
In thinking of the manifold of Leibnizian possible worlds, we must avoid 
any inclination to keep our  imagination under too tight a rein. Possible 
worlds can differ from ours very drastically indeed. And worlds whose 
substances are radically different and behave in line with radically different 
laws of nature might well have a spatial structure quite different from ours. 
Leibniz's project of a n a l ~ ~ s i s  situs ("topology" as we nowadays call it) actually 
represents an  attempt to devise a theory of spatial relationships that does not 
involve the whole range of specific commitments of a full-blown Euclidean 
geometry. One may feel certain that Leibniz would have been neither sur- 
prised nor dismayed at  the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries, and that 
he would have had n o  difficulty in assimilating such a diversity of spatial 
structures to  his own theory of space. 
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9. The Important Fact That, for Leibniz, Time is Coordinate With Space. 
The analogous aspects of time can now be treated briefly. Time, for Leibniz, 
is conceptually coordinate with space: one could not have space in an  
atemporal context, nor conversely. For  space is the order of co-exisience- 
that is, the order among the mutually contemporaneous states of things; while 
time is the order of succession, that is, the order among the various different 
mutually coexisting states of things which, qua mutually coexisting, must of 
course have some sort of spatial structure. 
A cinematographic analogy is helpful here. T o  be sure, Leibniz himselfdid 
not think of the matter in this naive pictorial way. But he thought of it in 
roughly equivalent terms-namely, in terms of mathematical analogues in 
the theory of real-variable functions. Plato notwithstanding, not all philoso- 
phers are mathematicians, and a pictorial approach may help to get the point 
across more effectively. 
Take a motion picture film: the film reels, say, for "Gone With the Wind." 
And let us suppose that  a n  immense jig-saw puzzle is created by the cutting 
up of this film-first into individual frames and then even more fineIy. The 
Leibnizian ordering problem is now a two-fold one, first to assemble all of the 
individual frames-the contemporaneity (or coexistence) slices that define 
its spatial order; and second the ordering of these contemporaneity slices into 
the proper sequence that defines a temporal order. For Leibniz, space and 
time thus stand in a n  inseparable co-ordination with one another in the 
overall ordering process that begins from the starting point of the particular 
states of individual substances and arrives at  an  all-comprehending spatio- 
temporal order. This coordinated symbiosis of space and time is a n  important 
aspect of Leibniz's metaphysics. For him-unlike Kant-space and time are 
mutually coordinate in such a way that neither is more fundamental than the 
other. 
The factor of world-to-world variation thus enters into operation once 
more-but now with respect to  time itself. For  the temporal order need by no 
means be that of the present "Newtonian" world in which time (presumably) 
flows in the equable manner of a continuous parameter changing uniformly. 
A discrete time consisting of discrete discontinuous jumps, for example, is 
perfectly conceivable on Leibnizian principles-not, t o  be sure, as a condition 
holding in this best of possible worlds, but for one of its possible albeit sub- 
optimal alternatives. In general, time, like space, need not be structurally 
uniform across possible worlds. 
10. Can a Possible World Lack Spatiotemporal Structure? 
We come finally to  a rather delicate Leibnizian issue. Could a possible 
world lack a spatiotemporal structure altogether? Could the states of its 
substances be in such a whirl of "blooming, buzzing confusion" that a space- 
time order is simply lacking? 
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Leibni;. would surely argue that this cannot be-that a world cannot lack 
a space-time order any more than it can lack a causal order. After all, even a 
chaotic arrangement is some sort of "ordering"-even a random ordering is 
an ordering (and a very characteristic sort of ordering at that). 
In the Di.~cotrrs o n  Metaph11.5ic.\, Leibni;. formulates the issue in the 
following terms: 
God does nothing whlch 1s not orderly, a n d .  . ~t is noteven posstble toconce~ve ofevents 
wh~ch are not regular T h ~ s  IS so true that not only does no th~ng occur In t h ~ s  world 
whlch 15 absolutely Irregular, but it IS even ~mposs~ble  to conceive of such an occurrcnce 
Because, let us suppose for example that some onejots down a quantity of points upon a 
sheet of paper helter skelter I say that ~t IS poss~ble to find a geometr~cal ~ n e  whose 
concept shall be uniform and constant, that IS, In accordance w ~ t h  a certaln formula, and 
wh~ch 11ne at the same tlme shall pass through all of those points, and rn the same o r d e r ~ n  
wh~ch the hand jotted them down, also . . ~t 1s poss~ble to find a mental equ~valent, a 
formula or an equatton common to all the points of thls ltne by vlrtue of wh~chformulathe 
change? In thedlrect~on ofthe l ~ n e  must occur There 19 no ~nstanceofa face whosecontour 
doe7 not form part of a geometric l ~ n e  and whlch can not be traced cntlre by a certaln 
mathemat~cal motlon. But when the formula IS very complex, that wh~ch conforms to ~t 
passes for irregular. Thus we may say that In whatever manner Cod might have created the 
world. ~t would always have been regular and In a certaln order (Drrcour.ce or? Mera- 
plilwc \. 56)  
T o  be sure, there are possible worlds so  chaotic in their make-up that it 
would be inappropriate to characteri~e the relationships among the states of 
its substances as generating a "spatiotemporal order" as \cle k n o w  i t ,  judging 
in terms of the continuities and regularities of our world. But to  say this is to 
say little more than that the world with which we are  familiar-the world we 
ourselves inhabit-is a very special one in the Leibnizian framework. It is, 
after all, the he.51 possible world in a respect that puts prime emphasis on 
lawfulness and rational order. 
In sum, then Leibni;. holds that every possible world has a spatiotemporal 
structure of some sort--one that is as unique to and characteristic of it a s  the 
substances that constitute it and the laws that govern them. 
NOTES 
In thls article I use the follow~ng abbreviations for references In the text Phil. = Dre 
phr losol~h~~chen Sthrrf irn von G W. I.elhnrz, ed. by C. I Gerhardt, 7 vols. (Berlln, 1875-1890); 
Jagoclrnshv = Lethrirtraria elerr~er~ta phrlosc~pliror artanae ci~, snrnmo rerun].  ed by 1 Jagodinsky 
(Kazan, 1913), Loeniher = Cottfrred Wrlheln? Lerhnrz. Phrlo\ophrc~al Pol~ersatidLettc~rr, ed and 
trans by L E Loemker (Dordrecht. 1969) All translat~ons Into Engl~sh are mlne unless other- 
wrse noted 
I ,  Phrl , 11, pp 450-451 
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2. See Anthony Quinton. "Spaces and Times," Philosoph~ 37 (1962): 130-147. Compare 
also Norman Swartz, "Spatial Worlds and Temporal Worlds: Could There Be More Than One 
of Each," Rario 17 (1975): 217-228. T h ~ s  d~scuss~on moots the prospect of several dist~nct space- 
t ~ m e  frameworks for the real. These d~scussions are, however, different from our present Inquiry, 
w h ~ c h  in effect asks whether the space-time framework (or frameworks) for reaha do or do not 
co~ncide with those for possibilia. 
3. Perhaps this example involves a slight overstatement, since in each instance it was 
possible by some process (however mysterious) to transpose someone from our world to the 
imagined one. 
4. This opuscule was written in Pans on April 15, 1676 
5. "There is among monads no spatla1 prox~mity or d~stance, strtctly speaking. To  say they 
are located at  a polnt o r  distr~buted in space IS to employ certain f~ctions of our m ~ n d ,  i m a g ~ n ~ n g  
to be so in reality that which can only be so in thought" (to Des Bosses. June 1 I ,  1712). 
